THE COLD CIVIL WAR: THE BATTLE TO EXECUTE THE 1972 SPACE AGREEMENT

Abstract

In 1972, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed an agreement committing them to working with each other on space-related matters, most famously resulting in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) of 1975. The U.S. government soured on the idea of space collaborations with the Soviets as the decade passed and the Reagan Administration allowed the agreement to expire in 1982. This thesis answers the question as to how and why Washington shifted its stance on working with the Soviets in space. The title of this thesis alludes to the duel between two camps in the U.S. government, which sought to respectively advocate for and undermine the agreement. This internal power struggle shaped American policy on joint space ventures with the Soviets. This thesis contributes to scholarship discussing U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation on two counts. Scholars identify the U.S. political climate as limiting the ASTP’s long-term political impact but fail to explain how the momentum in Washington turned against cooperation. This thesis addresses that gap. It also argues that any examination of collaboration in space between the two superpowers in the 1970s should focus on the 1972 agreement, rather than historians’ current emphasis on the ASTP. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. space agencies enjoyed a productive working relationship that continued even after the White House chose not to renew the agreement. Readers can draw wider implications from this thesis to the history of policymaking. This thesis shows how various agencies, including the CIA, NASA and NSA produced reports on the Soviets’ space program. It demonstrates how agency officials imposed their own biases in these reports, spinning events and observations to suit the agendas of either the pro-cooperation or anti-cooperation camps. If historians are to scrutinize a government’s policy decisions, they should analyze not just the key decision-makers in office, but also who informs the decision-makers.