WHAT WE OWE TO THE GLOBAL POOR: A DISCUSSION OF THOMAS POGGE'S VIEW

Abstract

Giving to the global poor is widely considered supererogatory. But is this all that morality demands of us? In this thesis, I explore the extent of our moral responsibility to the global poor, as framed in terms of Thomas Pogge¿s argument. I defend Pogge¿s thesis¿that affluent individuals are morally responsible for global poverty because they have partly caused it¿against a number of important criticisms. While I show these objections to be largely unsuccessful, I suggest that they nevertheless point us to the limits of what Pogge can claim. I argue that Pogge does not succeed in establishing the strong conclusions that he draws about the extent of our moral obligations to the global poor. In concluding, I defend a more nuanced account of moral responsibility than the one Pogge offers.