Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09658-8
DC FieldValue
dc.titleBest practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games
dc.contributor.authorChen, Roy
dc.contributor.authorChen, Yan
dc.contributor.authorRiyanto, Yohanes E.
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-13T01:20:25Z
dc.date.available2022-10-13T01:20:25Z
dc.date.issued2020-05-26
dc.identifier.citationChen, Roy, Chen, Yan, Riyanto, Yohanes E. (2020-05-26). Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games. Experimental Economics 24 (1) : 2-30. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09658-8
dc.identifier.issn1386-4157
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/232945
dc.description.abstractRecently, social science research replicability has received close examination, with discussions revolving around the degree of success in replicating experimental results. We lend insight to the replication discussion by examining the quality of replication studies. We examine how even a seemingly minor protocol deviation in the experimental process (Camerer et al. in Science 351(6280):143–1436, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf0918), the removal of common information, can lead to a finding of “non-replication” of the results from the original study (Chen and Chen in Am Econ Rev 101(6):2562–2589, 2011). Our analysis of the data from the original study, its replication, and a series of new experiments shows that, with common information, we obtain the original result in Chen and Chen (2011), whereas without common information, we obtain the null result in Camerer et al. (2016). Together, we use our findings to propose a set of procedure recommendations to increase the quality of replications of laboratory experiments in the social sciences. © 2020, The Author(s).
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceScopus OA2021
dc.subjectCommon information
dc.subjectCoordination games
dc.subjectGroup identity
dc.subjectReplication
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1007/s10683-020-09658-8
dc.description.sourcetitleExperimental Economics
dc.description.volume24
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page2-30
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