|Title:||The Counteridentical Account of Explanatory Identities||Authors:||Wilhelm, Isaac||Issue Date:||Feb-2021||Publisher:||Philosophy Documentation Center||Citation:||Wilhelm, Isaac (2021-02). The Counteridentical Account of Explanatory Identities. The Journal of Philosophy 118 (2) : 57-78. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil202111826||Abstract:||
Many explanations rely on identity facts. In this paper, I propose an account of how identity facts explain: roughly, the fact that A is identical to B explains another fact whenever that other fact depends, counterfactually, on A being identical to B. As I show, this account has many virtues. It avoids several problems facing accounts of explanatory identities, and when precisified using structural equations, it can be used to defend interventionist accounts of causation against an objection.
|Source Title:||The Journal of Philosophy||URI:||https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/230098||ISSN:||0022362X||DOI:||10.5840/jphil202111826|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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