THE EFFECTS OF PAYOFF MAGNITUDE ON YOUNG CHILDREN’S STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR

Abstract

The decision to tell lies entails both benefits and costs. Previous studies, though limited, have shown that material benefits promote children’s dishonesty (Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011; Markiewicz & Gawryluk, 2019). This study aims to extend previous work by investigating whether varying payoff magnitudes will influence their strategic behaviour, as measured using the hide-and-seek task. Ninety-five children aged three to six participated in this study. Children went through three levels of incentive sizes – No Incentives (0 point), Small Incentives (1 point), and Big Incentives (3 points). The results showed that children were significantly more likely to lie in the presence of incentives. Significant age differences were also found. Younger children displayed similar lying frequencies regardless of whether the payoff was small or big, while older children were significantly more likely to lie when the payoffs were bigger. Children’s lying frequency in the different payoff levels was not related to their cognitive abilities, such as theory-of-mind and executive function. Our findings demonstrate the driving role of material payoffs on children as young as 3 years old, and offer novel insights into the development of children’s decision to engage in strategic behaviour.