Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22463
DC FieldValue
dc.titleCredit card interchange fees
dc.contributor.authorRochet, J.-C.
dc.contributor.authorWright, J.
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-03T08:10:21Z
dc.date.available2011-05-03T08:10:21Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationRochet, J.-C., Wright, J. (2010). Credit card interchange fees. Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (8) : 1788-1797. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.issn03784266
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/22463
dc.description.abstractWe build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. In the model a monopoly card network always selects an interchange fee that exceeds the level that maximizes consumer surplus. If regulators only care about consumer surplus, a conservative regulatory approach is to cap interchange fees based on retailers' net avoided costs from not having to provide credit themselves. This always raises consumer surplus compared to the unregulated outcome, sometimes to the point of maximizing consumer surplus. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.02.026
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectCredit cards
dc.subjectPayments
dc.subjectTwo-sided markets
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Banking and Finance
dc.description.volume34
dc.description.issue8
dc.description.page1788-1797
dc.description.codenJBFID
dc.identifier.isiut000279440500006
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

Show simple item record
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

27
checked on Feb 27, 2018

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

24
checked on Dec 31, 2018

Page view(s)

269
checked on May 21, 2019

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.