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Title: Fallible Omniscience: Wittgenstein's Argument against Moral Naturalism
Keywords: full information account of goodness, knowledge argument, moral disagreement, moral naturalism, open question argument, Wittgenstein
Issue Date: 28-Mar-2010
Citation: JACKLYN APO CLEOFAS (2010-03-28). Fallible Omniscience: Wittgenstein's Argument against Moral Naturalism. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: Although in his lecture on ethics Wittgenstein explicitly adopts some of G.E. Moore?s ideas, the two philosophers? parallel views on ethics have not been appreciated much. But in this lecture Wittgenstein presents a new version of Moore?s argument. This dissertation seeks not only to demonstrate that Wittgenstein?s argument against moral naturalism is similar to Moore?s well-known open question argument; it also argues that Wittgenstein?s argument is better. The argument is based on the idea that someone who knows all natural facts would not know whether something is morally good. This new argument is Wittgenstein?s only in the sense that it originates from some remarks that he makes in his lecture on ethics. Hence it is discussed not in exegetical but in philosophical terms. The new argument against moral naturalism is explained and defended to show that it presents a new and interesting way to argue against some contemporary forms of moral naturalism.
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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