HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION PROVISION IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS

Abstract

This thesis investigates the effects of heterogeneous traffic information provision on road networks. Firstly, a generalized Wardrop equilibrium model is developed to capture route choices of travelers with exogenous and heterogeneous information sets about available routes, based on which the conditions and effects of an informational paradox are examined. Then, information providers’ (IPs) behavior is incorporated to consider endogenous and heterogeneous information using game-theoretical methods and bi-level programming. Three games are considered for IPs’ three behaviors: Nash game, Stackelberg game, and cooperation. Finally, travelers’ perception errors on path travel time are incorporated in the route choice model. A two-sided market equilibrium model is developed to investigate both travelers’ route and vehicle choices with the presence of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). CAVs at various automation levels and human-driven vehicles provide travelers information with different quality, leading to different route choices. The distribution of traffic congestion determined by travelers’ route choices also affects vehicle choices’ penetrations.