Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.001
DC Field | Value | |
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dc.title | Capital gains lock-in and governance choices | |
dc.contributor.author | Dimmock, Stephen G | |
dc.contributor.author | Gerken, William C | |
dc.contributor.author | Ivkovic, Zoran | |
dc.contributor.author | Weisbenner, Scott J | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-08T01:55:37Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-08T01:55:37Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-01-01 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Dimmock, Stephen G, Gerken, William C, Ivkovic, Zoran, Weisbenner, Scott J (2018-01-01). Capital gains lock-in and governance choices. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 127 (1) : 113-135. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.001 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304405X | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/205640 | |
dc.description.abstract | Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed. | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | |
dc.source | Elements | |
dc.subject | Social Sciences | |
dc.subject | Business, Finance | |
dc.subject | Economics | |
dc.subject | Business & Economics | |
dc.subject | Mutual fund | |
dc.subject | Proxy voting | |
dc.subject | Corporate governance | |
dc.subject | Capital-gains tax | |
dc.subject | Lock-in effect | |
dc.subject | MUTUAL FUND FLOWS | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | |
dc.subject | EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION | |
dc.subject | BUSINESS TIES | |
dc.subject | OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | RETURNS | |
dc.subject | INTERVENTION | |
dc.subject | BLOCKHOLDERS | |
dc.subject | LIQUIDITY | |
dc.subject | INVESTORS | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.date.updated | 2021-11-06T01:33:38Z | |
dc.contributor.department | FINANCE | |
dc.description.doi | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.001 | |
dc.description.sourcetitle | JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | |
dc.description.volume | 127 | |
dc.description.issue | 1 | |
dc.description.page | 113-135 | |
dc.published.state | Published | |
dc.description.redeposit | completed | |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications Elements |
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File | Description | Size | Format | Access Settings | Version | |
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Capital gains lock-in.pdf | 450.57 kB | Adobe PDF | OPEN | Post-print | View/Download |
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