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Title: Supercore and Strong Nash Equilibrium
Keywords: supercore, subsolution, strong Nash equilibrium, normal form game
Issue Date: 1-Aug-2010
Citation: ZHANG ZILONG (2010-08-01). Supercore and Strong Nash Equilibrium. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This paper studies the relation between Roth's (1976) notion of "supercore" and Aumann's (1959) notion of "strong Nash equilibrium" in normal-form games. Inarraet al. (2007) studied the relation between the supercore and Nash equilibrium; in particular, they offered a procedure to find the supercore in normal-form games. I extends Inarra et al.'s procedure to complex social interactions. This paper shows that the supercore under social interactions coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the final game defined in the procedure. This study provides a valuable and useful insight into the equilibrium strategic behavior.
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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