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|Title:||Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information||Authors:||Fu, H.
|Issue Date:||2007||Citation:||Fu, H., Sun, Y., Yannelis, N.C., Zhang, Z. (2007). Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 43 (5) : 523-531. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001||Abstract:||We introduce a new game form which allows the players' strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players' payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players' strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common information, we prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for such a game by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.©2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.||Source Title:||Journal of Mathematical Economics||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/20040||ISSN:||03044068||DOI:||10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.001|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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