Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012
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dc.titleMulti-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
dc.contributor.authorBag, P.K.
dc.contributor.authorSabourian, H.
dc.contributor.authorWinter, E.
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-24T06:55:01Z
dc.date.available2011-02-24T06:55:01Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationBag, P.K., Sabourian, H., Winter, E. (2009). Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency. Journal of Economic Theory 144 (3) : 1278-1299. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012
dc.identifier.issn00220531
dc.identifier.issn10957235
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/19966
dc.description.abstractA class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions.©2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectCondorcet consistency
dc.subjectMarkov equilibrium
dc.subjectMulti-stage voting
dc.subjectScoring rules
dc.subjectSequential elimination
dc.subjectTop cycle
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Economic Theory
dc.description.volume144
dc.description.issue3
dc.description.page1278-1299
dc.description.codenJECTA
dc.identifier.isiut000266115000017
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