Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001
DC FieldValue
dc.titlePerfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
dc.contributor.authorSun, Y.
dc.contributor.authorYannelis, N.C.
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-24T06:54:58Z
dc.date.available2011-02-24T06:54:58Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationSun, Y., Yannelis, N.C. (2007). Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives. Journal of Economic Theory 134 (1) : 175-194. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001
dc.identifier.issn00220531
dc.identifier.issn10957235
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/19962
dc.description.abstractThe idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents' relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without "common values". Consequently, the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved exactly, and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large, but finite private information economies.©2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAsymmetric information
dc.subjectIncentive compatibility
dc.subjectNegligible private information
dc.subjectPareto efficiency
dc.subjectPerfect competition
dc.subjectWalrasian allocation
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001
dc.description.sourcetitleJournal of Economic Theory
dc.description.volume134
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.page175-194
dc.description.codenJECTA
dc.identifier.isiut000246589400008
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