LOGISTICS AND ALLIED GRAND STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II: THE BURMA PROBLEM

Abstract

Logistics has not been a topic of much interest to most people. Its importance, especially in the field of militaTy operations, has not been fully appreciated as evident by the volume of literature on the topic which is small in comparison to that on strategy and tactics. True, strategy and tactics are necessary for victory, but nothing would be possible without logistics. The Anglo-American Alliance of World War II found this to be especially true between 1941 and 1944 when, constrained by limited resources, they were unable to conduct all the operations needed to fulfill their agreed grand strategy. In reality, modifications had to be made to their strategy due to the constraints in logistics. The campaign in Burma was an ©cample of the constraints not only of global logistics, but also of how local logistic difficulties impacted on global strategic development. Major offensive operations in Burma were launched only in 1944 and then only in reaction to a Japanese offensive which had considerably weakened the Japanese position. In examining the relative inactivity of the Allies in Burma during the above period due to the impact of logistics, this Academic Exercise hopes to show that between 1941 and 1944 logistics was the most important determinant in Allied grand strategy.