TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING STEALTHY CYBER AND CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

Abstract

Computer networks play a vital role in electric transmission and distribution systems as they exchange measurement values and control signals between geographically dispersed field devices and the control center where the monitoring and operation procedures are carried out. The communication channels used in electric grids have recently become a target for saboteurs to destabilize the operation of the electric network, for example, by creating power outages or overloading and damaging a set of equipment. Attacks that can evade traditional detection techniques are more damaging since they can do enough harm to the system in a stealthy manner before the operators in the control center can identify them and do any corrective action to limit the damage. This thesis focuses on developing techniques for detecting such stealthy attacks which manipulate the measurement values and control signals such that the power supply in transmission and distribution systems is not disrupted.