Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.05.006
DC FieldValue
dc.titleElectoral manipulation, opposition power, and institutional change: Contesting for electoral reform in Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia
dc.contributor.authorOng, Elvin
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-07T06:20:13Z
dc.date.available2021-07-07T06:20:13Z
dc.date.issued2018-08-01
dc.identifier.citationOng, Elvin (2018-08-01). Electoral manipulation, opposition power, and institutional change: Contesting for electoral reform in Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia. ELECTORAL STUDIES 54 : 159-171. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.05.006
dc.identifier.issn02613794
dc.identifier.issn18736890
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/193751
dc.description.abstractOpposition forces in electoral authoritarian regimes frequently protest against electoral manipulation with varying degrees of success. Why are opposition forces in some countries able to turnout the masses and successfully pressure a dominant regime to allow for electoral reform, whereas those in other countries exhibit much less success? This article argues that the cognitive complexity of electoral manipulation and the form of opposition organization explain divergent contestation and reform trajectories. Where the complexity of electoral manipulation is high, opposition forces are demobilized. Where the complexity of electoral manipulation is low, opposition forces may potentially mobilize the masses to protest for reform. Subsequently, the type of electoral reform – technocratic or partisan – pivots on whether opposition power is concentrated in one veto player or dispersed among multiple actors. I test the arguments through a controlled comparison of electoral reform in three Southeast Asian electoral authoritarian regimes – Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCI LTD
dc.sourceElements
dc.subjectSocial Sciences
dc.subjectPolitical Science
dc.subjectGovernment & Law
dc.subjectElectoral authoritarian regimes
dc.subjectElectoral manipulation
dc.subjectElectoral reform
dc.subjectInstitutional change
dc.subjectSoutheast Asia
dc.subjectSingapore
dc.subjectMalaysia
dc.subjectCambodia
dc.subjectAUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectELECTIONS
dc.subjectDEMOCRATIZATION
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectCOALITIONS
dc.subjectFRAUD
dc.subjectPARTY
dc.subjectINCENTIVES
dc.subjectOBSERVERS
dc.subjectPOLITICS
dc.typeArticle
dc.date.updated2021-07-06T16:59:30Z
dc.contributor.departmentDEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
dc.description.doi10.1016/j.electstud.2018.05.006
dc.description.sourcetitleELECTORAL STUDIES
dc.description.volume54
dc.description.page159-171
dc.published.statePublished
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