WHEN LEVIATHANS PRETEND : HOW AUTHORITARIAN ELECTIONS LEAD TO DEMOCRACY

Abstract

This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that electoral authoritarianism is necessarily damaging for democracy; I offer a more optimistic perspective of electoral authoritarianism as laying important foundations for future democratization. Through a brief qualitative survey of ten Southeast Asian countries, I observe that a country's past experience of electoral authoritarianism positively affects its democratization. I theorize that elite support for elections, and elite receptivity towards electoral outcomes, are fostered under electoral authoritarianism through behavioural routinization. In countries that have experienced electoral authoritarianism, elites tend to accept electoral results and support continued elections, allowing democratic progress. Meanwhile, in countries that have not experienced electoral authoritarianism, elite disdain for elections leads to their rejection of electoral processes, and ultimately, democratic reversal. I find support for my theory in four case studies: Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma and Thailand, and conclude that authoritarian elections may lead to democracy.