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Title: Relevance and Verification
Authors: Blumson, Ben 
Issue Date: 30-Oct-2020
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation: Blumson, Ben (2020-10-30). Relevance and Verification. The Philosophical Quarterly. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: Abstract A. J. Ayer’s empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual statements on the other. Unfortunately for Ayer, it follows from classical logic that his criterion is trivial—it classifies all statements as either tautologies or genuinely factual, but none as nonsense. However, in this paper, I argue that Ayer’s criterion of meaning can be defended from classical proofs of its triviality by the adoption of a relevant logic—an idea which is motivated because, according to Ayer, the genuinely factual statements are those which observation is relevant to.
Source Title: The Philosophical Quarterly
ISSN: 00318094
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaa071
Appears in Collections:Staff Publications

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