THE TROUBLE WITH KNOWING ONE'S OWN MIND : AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE OF INTROSPECTION

Abstract

The nature of introspection - the process by means of which we come to know our own occurrent state of mind - is one of the most commonly ignored or overlooked aspects of the mind in philosophical discussions of mental phenomena. And those who do pay attention to it, whatever their purposes are for doing so, either overrate or underrate the power of introspection to reveal the activities of our own minds. This thesis aims to go some way towards plugging this gap in philosophical investigations into the mind by way of providing a positive account of the nature of introspection. According to the account proposed and defended in what follows, when we have a state of mind, we automatically receive or obtain information about which state of mind it is that we are having. I call this the basic account. This account of introspection aims to remain faithful to the traditional conception of the phenomenon under investigation, which conception states that introspection is both causally and epistemically direct. The heart of this thesis (chapters 3 and 4) is devoted to stating the basic account, and explaining it by applying it to our knowledge of both our own occurrent perceptual experiences and our own occurrent propositional attitudes. Attention is also given to demonstrating how the basic account is faithful to the traditional conception of introspection.

The thesis begins in chapter 1 with a brief introduction of the phenomenon to be explained. In the same chapter, various preliminary matters relating to terminology, the scope of discussion, guarding against possible misconceptions, and so on, are taken care of. Chapter 2 contains an initial exploration into the nature of introspection, drawing out the difficulties an account of introspection must address. Given that the account of introspection defended here is essentially a version of the traditional conception of introspection, it is susceptible to the same objections and challenges that have been aimed at the traditional conception. At appropriate points in the following discussion, I address these objections and challenges, sometimes answering the objections and challenges directly, at other times dealing with them indirectly. Chapter 5 deals, in a more or less direct manner, with two of such objections and challenges.