WEAKNESS OF WILL : THE ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT AND BEYOND

Abstract

This thesis is a philosophical investigation into 'akrasia' or weakness of will, as it is popularly known. The phenomenon is familiar enough to most people but philosophers have been unable to satisfactorily explain how it occurs, and how it is even possible. I argue that this is the result of firstly, an emphasis on too restrictive a theory of rationality in explaining intentional action, and secondly, a neglect of other motivational factors which operate independently of practical reason. I then attempt to give a better account of akrasia by avoiding these two shortcomings which are found in other discussions of the subject. Both Plato and Aristotle effectively deny the existence of akrasia as it is commonly conceived. But Aristotle has an account of practical reason which can allow for the possibility of akrasia. This requires that we not interpret him as the Humean he is often taken to be. It is not true that Aristotle only allows for deliberation about the means to given ends and not about the ends themselves. In fact, practical deliberation is a two-way process where in seeking more determinate instances of an indeterminate end, one is at the same time arriving at a better apprehension of the end. The latter process is inductive. The conclusion of inductive reasoning is defeasible so that it is not necessarily irrational not to accept this conclusion. There is no self-contradiction involved in rejecting it. However, something more needs to be said about how the choice between rational alternatives is made. Thus, Aristotelian views can still form the basis for an account of akrasia which does not deny the phenomenon. But to show that akrasia really occurs, especially in those cases where we normally attribute it to an agent, explanations must be given which detail the structures of motivation. Our investigation reveals at least three possible kinds of akrasia, some cases of which take place within the reasoning process and others after deliberation has been concluded. But unless we can provide good reasons for believing that the structures adduced to explain akrasia are actually utilised by persons in some of the common cases of akrasia, akrasia as described may still remain an unrealised possibility. This we do by examining what the concept of a person involves. It turns out that the concept supports the notion of a will which lacks full integration, a notion which is important in the structure for last-ditch akrasia. The application of the concept can also be extended to cover the other two kinds of akrasia which do not involve a will lacking integration but rather, the exploitation of situations of uncertainty in a self-deceptive manner to facilitate akrasia. One consequence of our account of akrasia is that attempts to be creative count as instances of akrasia. This shows that the phenomenon is not necessarily undesirable. However, other occurrences of akrasia may involve a kind of moral fault. Because the same mechanism is involved, creative persons are often susceptible to intemperate behaviour in their personal lives.