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https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/174866
DC Field | Value | |
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dc.title | DIRECTLY VOLUNTARY BELIEFS | |
dc.contributor.author | SIMON ANG WEN PIN | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-08T14:55:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-08T14:55:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1998 | |
dc.identifier.citation | SIMON ANG WEN PIN (1998). DIRECTLY VOLUNTARY BELIEFS. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/174866 | |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis examines the question of whether beliefs can be voluntary. More specifically, it asks whether one could directly and voluntarily acquire a belief. In some uninteresting ways, it is entirely possible to voluntarily acquire a belief. Hypnotism is one example. However, beliefs acquired through hypnotism (and the like) are generally considered as indirectly voluntary beliefs, for their acquisition require the agents to perform some other action, other than just thinking about the belief itself. So what is a directly voluntary belief? The analogy is commonly drawn with raising one's hand. If only I so desire, I can raise my hand directly and voluntarily just by thinking about raising my hand, and nothing else. Can I, in an analogous way, will to acquire a certain belief that p,just like that? That is to say, can I voluntarily will myself to acquire the belief just because I so desire, without any consideration of the truth of p, and in a direct manner by simply thinking about the belief itself and nothing else? It seems prudent to begin with the question of "what is a belief?", and it seems to me that the answer must be sought from two perspectives - one metaphysical, the other epistemological. It is from these two paths that I approach the question. The first approach is metaphysical. This thesis begins by looking at the various theories of mind that are currently available to us. Assuming that a belief is a mental state, is there anything within the current theories of mind that deny the possibility of directly voluntary beliefs? The conclusion that I draw here is in the negative. The second approach is epistemological. If metaphysically, there is nothing to deny the possibility of directly voluntary beliefs, perhaps the very meaning of 'belief’ denies such a possibility. Perhaps a directly voluntary belief is impossible in the way that a female bachelor is impossible. Even if logically possible, some argue, a directly voluntary belief must surely be irrational, must it not? I shall argue firstly that a directly voluntary belief is, epistemologically speaking, logically possible. Secondly, I shall argue that a directly voluntary belief is at least sometimes rational. Finally, I shall argue that a certain type of voluntary beliefs, which have been commonly labelled as indirectly voluntary, should be more properly considered as directly voluntary, and as such provide real life examples of directly voluntary beliefs. | |
dc.source | CCK BATCHLOAD 20200918 | |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.contributor.department | PHILOSOPHY | |
dc.contributor.supervisor | JOHN WILLIAMS | |
dc.description.degree | Master's | |
dc.description.degreeconferred | MASTER OF ARTS | |
Appears in Collections: | Master's Theses (Restricted) |
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