THE POLICY OF ARISTOTELIAN 'VIRTUE' IN MORAL THEORY

Abstract

The distinction we make today between moral and non-moral virtues is entirely lacking in Aristotle's ethics; even though his 'aret? ?thikos' is widely translated as 'moral virtue' it has none of the characteristics associated with our conception of morality as, e.g., a sphere involving only our social activities, or a system of absolutely binding rules. Therefore we make a mistake if we analysed Aristotelian virtue ethics in terms of the demands that we make of our modern moral theories: that it tells us what is the right thing to do in specific circumstances; that it tells us when an agent has performed an out-of-character act; and that it tells us when an act produces bad consequences. Some of these demands can be met. However, that they cannot all be met at least satisfactorily is down to the difference between an ethical and moral approach. Moral theory stresses the rightness of acts where Aristotle stressed the virtuousness of agents; it speaks in the language of duties and obligations where Aristotle did not. Examining Kant's moral theory vis-a-vis Aristotle's is indicative of where, how, and why they differ. The basis and justification of Aristotle's ethics lies in a technological assumption. Aristotelian motivation to action rests on desire. While there is nothing in Aristotle that speaks of the source of moral insight and of a theory of moral obligation, David Hume's moral philosophy is able to bridge that gap compatibly. The Humean source of moral insight lies in an impression or feeling; moral obligation is explained through the feeling of discomfort. Kant, in contrast, grounds the basis of morality on human reason. It is justified deontologically, and the source of moral insight lies in synthetic, a priori reasoning. The motivation to act can arise from the will, and it is in acting through one's will that one does one's duty. To act out of desire would be to act heteronomously, but Kantian morality consists of autonomous activity. Yet, Kant cannot avoid postulating a teleology altogether: his categorical imperative calls for the adoption of certain ends, and hence our duties can be imperfectly directed towards certain ends rather than perfectly according to a rule of action. Furthermore, there is an epistemological problem in knowing if an agent acted out of a sense of duty, if this sense of duty could not be a feeling (like desire.) The difference between the Kantian and Humean theories of obligation would also be smaller than assumed, if acting out of one's sense of duly does involve a feeling after all. At the end, we discover that amidst his theory of virtues Kant does possess the concept of moral sentiments; they are distinct from Hume's only in that they arise autonomously from the agent's recognition of the moral law. But all these indicate that Aristotelian virtue ethics is not incommensurable with Kantian moral theory, and that they are even more similar than assumed. If there is any significant difference between the two, then it lies only in the concept of the 'perfectly moral person', where it is necessary to reconstruct the agent's motivations and the decision-making process. The importance of this concept, however, is not indubitable.