REPRESENTATION IN SINGAPORE'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE : AN ECONOMIC EXPLORATORY STUDY

Abstract

The criminal procedure in Singapore allows a defence counsel to submit a "representation" to the prosecutor. This thesis attempts to analyse the economic aspects of such pre-trial negotiation. In particular, the role of bargaining costs and pre-play communication under an asymmetric information environment is considered. The aim is to examine the implications on economic efficiency of the criminal litigation game, played out by the public prosecutor and the defendant. If there was perfect information and costless bargaining, any settlement reached between the prosecutor and the defendant would be Pareto optimal. On the other hand, where there is imperfect information, the defendant will be unsure of the strength of the prosecution's case based. on the charges laid out. Thus, the defendant is prevented from making a reasonable and effective representation, since any representation submitted is based on the defendant's beliefs.W e present a game theoretic model which is reflective of the process of representation as practised in Singapore. The outcome of the model is that reasonably high bargaining costs will enable the signals (termed "costless communication") sent by the prosecutor to be more credible to the defendant, thereby allowing a more efficient settlement outcome. On the other hand, bargaining with little or no costs would remove the credibility of the signals; the final outcome may be Pareto inefficient. Lastly, the model is applied to the traffic offence fine system. By using a survey, it is possible to gain some understanding of the traffic offence fine system, with regards to its social efficiency