Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/171423
DC FieldValue
dc.titleTHE ECONOMICS OF BAIL SETTING
dc.contributor.authorKATHERINE LAI YUET CHENG
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-17T03:27:36Z
dc.date.available2020-07-17T03:27:36Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.identifier.citationKATHERINE LAI YUET CHENG (1996). THE ECONOMICS OF BAIL SETTING. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/171423
dc.description.abstractThis academic exercise derives the bail bond that serves as an effective tool in securing the defendant's attendance at trial. This study shows that it is possible for a moderate bail be set even for capital offences. It is found that the probability of reapprehension and the expected cost of punishment are two important determinants in the granting and setting of bail amount. The bail system offers release from detention only to those who can provide some financial assurance that theyw will be available for trial. This discrimination between those with money and those without it for purposes of pre-trial release from detention may conflict with the equal protection and fairness notions. Efficiency provides an explanation as to why the bail system is what it is today.
dc.sourceCCK BATCHLOAD 20200722
dc.typeThesis
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS & STATISTICS
dc.contributor.supervisorLIM BOON TIONG
dc.description.degreeBachelor's
dc.description.degreeconferredBACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS)
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses

Show simple item record
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormatAccess SettingsVersion 
b19257478.pdf1.97 MBAdobe PDF

RESTRICTED

NoneLog In

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.