DAVID HUME ON LIBERTY, NECESSITY AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Abstract

David Hume discusses the notion of liberty and necessity in both his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) and his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). While scholars generally agree that Hume’s treatment of this subject has amounted to an important contribution to compatibilist views on freedom and determinism, there have been little agreement with regard to the cogency of Hume’s own arguments and account. This thesis seeks to respond to two central and related disagreements within contemporary scholarship to Hume’s account: (1) whether the account of liberty affirmed by Hume in the Treatise was the same that of the Enquiry and relatedly (2) whether Hume’s response to the problem of evil anticipated by his account was ironic. In doing so, this thesis explores central themes in Hume studies, including but not limited to, the relationship between the Treatise and the Enquiry, scepticism regarding the senses and Hume’s views on religion.