Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/170216
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dc.titleTRADE WAR: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH.
dc.contributor.authorJUDY HO MINJUN
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-18T01:01:40Z
dc.date.available2020-06-18T01:01:40Z
dc.date.issued2019-11-04
dc.identifier.citationJUDY HO MINJUN (2019-11-04). TRADE WAR: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH.. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.urihttps://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/170216
dc.description.abstractIn the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is that players defect at every stage. However, in prisoners’ dilemma game experiments and in real-life situations where individuals have finite interactions with each other, it is observed that individuals do cooperate with each other. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that players have incomplete information about the opponent’s options. This paper shows that cooperation can occur when both players are uncertain about the opponent’s rationality and believe with some probability that the opponent can only play the tit-for-tat strategy. Factors that can improve cooperation between players are analysed. This paper also discusses the application of the incomplete information prisoners’ dilemma game model to international trade. This is in view of the increasing importance of international trade with globalisation which is evident in the widespread negative effects of the recent US-China trade war.
dc.subjectPrisoners’ dilemma
dc.subjectIncomplete information
dc.subjectInternational trade
dc.typeThesis
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.contributor.supervisorLUO XIAO
dc.description.degreeBachelor's
dc.description.degreeconferredBachelor of Science (Honours)
dc.description.degreeconferredBachelor of Social Sciences (Honours)
Appears in Collections:Bachelor's Theses

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