The value of delegation under unobservable contracts.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/16498

DC Field	Value
dc.title	The value of delegation under unobservable contracts.
dc.contributor.author	LI LEI
dc.date.accessioned	2010-04-08T11:05:36Z
dc.date.available	2010-04-08T11:05:36Z
dc.date.issued	2009-06-01
dc.identifier.citation	LI LEI (2009-06-01). The value of delegation under unobservable contracts.. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.uri	http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/16498
dc.description.abstract	This paper aims to answer the following question: whether delegation has value when the vertical contracts between the principal and the distributor are unobservable to outside party.Katz (1991) claimed that delegation has no effects on the final equilibrium in such a setting when a two part tariff pricing method is adopted to perfectly align the interest of the upstream firms and distributors, even if the firms compete for more than one period. This paper aims to reinterpret Katzb
dc.language.iso	en
dc.subject	delegation,unobservable,contracts
dc.type	Thesis
dc.contributor.department	ECONOMICS
dc.contributor.supervisor	JULIAN KARL DOUGLAS WRIGHT
dc.description.degree	Master's
dc.description.degreeconferred	MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
dc.identifier.isiut	NOT_IN_WOS
Appears in Collections:	Master's Theses (Open)

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