Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/16498
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dc.titleThe value of delegation under unobservable contracts.
dc.contributor.authorLI LEI
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-08T11:05:36Z
dc.date.available2010-04-08T11:05:36Z
dc.date.issued2009-06-01
dc.identifier.citationLI LEI (2009-06-01). The value of delegation under unobservable contracts.. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/16498
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to answer the following question: whether delegation has value when the vertical contracts between the principal and the distributor are unobservable to outside party.Katz (1991) claimed that delegation has no effects on the final equilibrium in such a setting when a two part tariff pricing method is adopted to perfectly align the interest of the upstream firms and distributors, even if the firms compete for more than one period. This paper aims to reinterpret Katzb
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectdelegation,unobservable,contracts
dc.typeThesis
dc.contributor.departmentECONOMICS
dc.contributor.supervisorJULIAN KARL DOUGLAS WRIGHT
dc.description.degreeMaster's
dc.description.degreeconferredMASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
dc.identifier.isiutNOT_IN_WOS
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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