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Title: The value of delegation under unobservable contracts.
Authors: LI LEI
Keywords: delegation,unobservable,contracts
Issue Date: 1-Jun-2009
Citation: LI LEI (2009-06-01). The value of delegation under unobservable contracts.. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This paper aims to answer the following question: whether delegation has value when the vertical contracts between the principal and the distributor are unobservable to outside party.Katz (1991) claimed that delegation has no effects on the final equilibrium in such a setting when a two part tariff pricing method is adopted to perfectly align the interest of the upstream firms and distributors, even if the firms compete for more than one period. This paper aims to reinterpret Katzb
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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