Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/155788
Title: RECLAIMING THE "LAW" IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE "RIGHT" TO ABORTION AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM TORTURE
Authors: ER SHENGTIAN, RACHEL
Issue Date: 9-Nov-2018
Citation: ER SHENGTIAN, RACHEL (2018-11-09). RECLAIMING THE "LAW" IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE "RIGHT" TO ABORTION AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM TORTURE. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: The twenty-first century is an “age of rights” in which every desirable interest or preference is unreflectively asserted as a “human right” or expansively interpreted into well-established human rights norms. The rapid proliferation of rights makes it difficult to separate binding human rights norms from non-binding political claims, which undermines the integrity of human rights law. This paper seeks to reclaim the “law” in human rights law by testing the procedural, substantive and interpretive legitimacy of the assertion that denials of voluntary abortions by medical professionals to pregnant women constitute “torture” in human rights law. In particular, it assesses whether Article 1 of the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment may be legitimately interpreted to encompass a right to torture. It also examines the political strategy behind the use of expansive interpretive methodologies to incorporate one of the most divisive moral and ethical issues, abortion, into one of international law’s most uncontroversial rights, the right to freedom from torture.
URI: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/155788
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