POLITICS OF CONFLICT AND DEFENCE : A CASE STUDY INTO THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1969-1972.

Abstract

This thesis was written from the methodological position of historicism. It begins with a compassion of the birth of China and Russia. It then discusses from a historical perspective the politics of conflict and defence in the Sino-Russian and Sino-Soviet relations. The friendly relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the early 1950's could not withstand the test of time. The concept of polycentrism in Communism developed and the PRC and the USSR found that they were in ideological dispute. It culminated in the Spring of 1969, as the two Communist giants fought on the Wusuli river over the disputed island, Chenpao, and along the region of Sinkiang. It revealed that Sino-Soviet schism had spread from ideological aspect to encompass disputes of national interests, national security and national survival. Unable to intimidate the Chinese leaders with their nuclear black-mail strategy", the Soviet leaders adopted a “peace strategy”. Having met at Peking airport on September 11, 1969, the Sino-Soviet leaders agreed to hold border negotiations in Peking to solve their discrepancies. Because of the pre-conditions set by the two antagonists for a settlement satisfactory to themselves, they failed to achieve any concrete results in the border negotiations. Both the PRC and the USSR developed a dichotomy in relations vis-a-vis each other. The PRC and the USSR appeared to be cordial in their state relations, as they exchanged their ambassadors and increased their vo1ume of trade. But on the ideological front, border issues, and in the United Nations, China and Russia continued to exchange polemics. Sine-Soviet rivalry continued unbridled. Strategies were employed by both sides to overtake the other for supremacy and survival. Aimed at keeping her predominant status as the leader in the Communist Bloc and as a world super-power, Moscow intensified her “peace strategies” which included detente with Washington, Bonn and other NATO powers. By giving an impression to the West that Moscow was a “dove of peace”, the Russian leaders thought that they could avoid a confrontation on two fronts - the Western and the Eastern. Meanwhile, in Asia, Moscow adopted a policy of Containment of China” – the Proposal of a Collective Security Systems in Asia”. Faced with these Soviet hostilities, Peking leadership favoured a policy of “power balance”. Thus, the Chinese leadership thought that they could ward off the Soviet pressure. Besides, striving to normalize her relations with Japan, consolidate ties with South Asian states and establish diplomatic relations intensively with non-Communist states