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https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/15205
DC Field | Value | |
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dc.title | The empty cartesian concept of a person | |
dc.contributor.author | TAY LING JUN, PATRINE | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-04-08T10:51:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-04-08T10:51:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006-03-18 | |
dc.identifier.citation | TAY LING JUN, PATRINE (2006-03-18). The empty cartesian concept of a person. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/15205 | |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis is an examination, and defence, of a particular argument put forth by P. F. Strawson in Individuals against the Cartesian concept of a person. This latter concept of a person is that of a compound entity made up of two distinct types of substance: a physical body, and a non-physical mind, otherwise known as an ego, or a subject of experience. The Cartesian further maintains that the essence of his concept of a person is that of a subject of experience. Strawson rejects this view. He holds that anyone whose concept of a person is essentially that of a subject of experience will not only fail to have the concept of other people, but also that of his own self. I offer a careful explanation of his argument, and maintain that it is sound. Lastly, I briefly examine Strawsona??s alternative account of a person, with which he substitutes the Cartesian concept. | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.subject | Strawson, Cartesian, Persons, Individuals, concept, ego | |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.contributor.department | PHILOSOPHY | |
dc.contributor.supervisor | D'CRUZ, MARK JOHN | |
dc.description.degree | Master's | |
dc.description.degreeconferred | MASTER OF ARTS | |
dc.identifier.isiut | NOT_IN_WOS | |
Appears in Collections: | Master's Theses (Open) |
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File | Description | Size | Format | Access Settings | Version | |
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The Empty Cartesian Concept of a Person.pdf | 1.15 MB | Adobe PDF | OPEN | None | View/Download |
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