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Title: The empty cartesian concept of a person
Keywords: Strawson, Cartesian, Persons, Individuals, concept, ego
Issue Date: 18-Mar-2006
Citation: TAY LING JUN, PATRINE (2006-03-18). The empty cartesian concept of a person. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This thesis is an examination, and defence, of a particular argument put forth by P. F. Strawson in Individuals against the Cartesian concept of a person. This latter concept of a person is that of a compound entity made up of two distinct types of substance: a physical body, and a non-physical mind, otherwise known as an ego, or a subject of experience. The Cartesian further maintains that the essence of his concept of a person is that of a subject of experience. Strawson rejects this view. He holds that anyone whose concept of a person is essentially that of a subject of experience will not only fail to have the concept of other people, but also that of his own self. I offer a careful explanation of his argument, and maintain that it is sound. Lastly, I briefly examine Strawsona??s alternative account of a person, with which he substitutes the Cartesian concept.
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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