Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/150314
Title: NEW APPROACHES TO INTUITION THEORY: ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENCES ACROSS INTUITIONAL TYPES
Authors: EUGENE YAO DENG GUI
Keywords: intuitions, intuitionism, epistemic feelings, feelings of truth, feelings of rightness, argument from disagreement
Issue Date: 18-Jul-2018
Citation: EUGENE YAO DENG GUI (2018-07-18). NEW APPROACHES TO INTUITION THEORY: ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENCES ACROSS INTUITIONAL TYPES. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: In this thesis, I argue for a re-evaluation of the way we theorize about intuitions. Instead of clumping intuitions together and theorizing about them as if they were a singular kind, I advocate a new approach that is sensitive to hitherto overlooked differences. I provide grounds for motivating the new approach by pointing out two kinds of differences that demand explanation. First, there are phenomenal differences in our experiences of intuitional types. Second, there are significant differences in epistemic properties across intuitional types. To make my point, I anchor my arguments in a comparison between moral intuitions and logical intuitions. Of course, merely surfacing differences between the two types will not be enough. I also argue that these differences are substantive, and that any good general theory of intuitions ought to account for them. I close by sketching the outlines of how a theory championing my approach will look like.
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/150314
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

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