EXPECTING A PLEASANT OPPONENT IN SALARY NEGOTIATION: THE EFFECTS OF POWER AND INTERPERSONAL OUTCOME EXPECTANCY ON NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES

Abstract

This study seeks to examine why some job applicants perform better than the others in a salary negotiation setting. Specifically, it seeks to elucidate the mechanisms underlying the influence of power and interpersonal outcome expectancy on job applicants’ expected and actual deal outcomes. Interpersonal outcome expectancy is operationalised as how positively an individual expect others to respond to his or her owns’ displayed assertiveness. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of a recruiter or job applicant in a two party dyad and tasked to participate in a salary negotiation over an online messaging application. Job applicants' power was manipulated. Results show that job applicants' power and interpersonal outcome expectancy did not have an effect on their expected deal outcomes, and expected deal outcome was not a mediator of the effect of power on actual deal outcomes. However, expected deal outcomes was found to be a significant predictor of actual deal outcomes. In addition, an interaction effect between power and interpersonal outcome expectancy on actual deal outcomes was found such that low power job applicants were able to perform better. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.