Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Equilibria in economies with asymmetric information and in games with many players
Authors: ZHU WEI
Keywords: asymmetric information, incentive compatible, large games
Issue Date: 23-Mar-2005
Citation: ZHU WEI (2005-03-23). Equilibria in economies with asymmetric information and in games with many players. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This thesis first considers an economy with many agents but asymmetric information. We show the existence of incentive compatible, competitive equilibrium for the case that except for one perfectly divisible good, all other goods are indivisible. As in the previous literature, we need to impose two special conditions associated with indivisible goods. One is a dispersedness assumption on a divisible commodity, and another the desirability of the divisible good. The second part of the thesis considers large games. We show the existence of Nash equilibrium for a game with continuum of players and a compact action space. The players' payoffs depend on their own actions and the mean of the transformed strategy profiles.
Appears in Collections:Master's Theses (Open)

Show full item record
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormatAccess SettingsVersion 
MyTHesis.pdf297.82 kBAdobe PDF



Page view(s)

checked on Apr 19, 2019


checked on Apr 19, 2019

Google ScholarTM


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.