The nature of truth

Abstract

Abstract I defend a deflationary approach to the problem of truth and argue that the robust theoriesa?? assumption that truth is a substantive property is unjustified. Thereafter, I present two prominent deflationary theories, namely, Quinea??s Disquotational Theory and Horwicha??s Minimal Theory. I argue that both theories fail to satisfy the two desiderata I set in this thesis for an ideal deflationary theory. I proceed to offer my account of truth. The truth predicate is a device for undertaking certain cognitive and conversational commitments. I substantiate my account with applications ranging from the simplest use of truth to its generalising uses in existential and universal claims, conditionals and with propositional attitudes expressions. Lastly, I argue that such understanding of the truth predicate explains everything about our concept and use of truth in language and thought. Hence deflationism.