Why do Constitutional Monarchs Intervene in Politics?

Abstract

There are at present 37 constitutional monarchs in the world who rule according to the constitution and do not personally exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers. More often than not, these sovereigns perform exclusively symbolic roles in their respective countries as ceremonial figureheads for national unity and have traditionally stayed away from governance. However, some of these Kings, Queens, or Co-Princes have defaulted on their constitutional expectations to stay out of domestic political affairs and have intervened in politics, even though this responsibility usually falls under the purview of the government and various state institutions. This puzzle forms the foundation to this thesis, which endeavours to find out why constitutional monarchies intervene in politics. James L. Perry’s Theory of Motivation will be adapted and applied to the contrasting case studies of Thailand and Sweden in order to elucidate the pivotal factors that can account for a monarch’s inclinations to intervene in politics. This thesis hopes to show that norms and the institutional environment surrounding the monarch are the most salient explanations for a constitutional monarch’s intervention in politics.