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Keywords: Game Theory, Bayesian Coalitional Rationality, tau-Theory, Perfect Correlated Equilibrium, Revelation Principle
Issue Date: 24-Aug-2017
Citation: QIAO YONGCHUAN (2017-08-24). ESSAYS ON GAME THEORY. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.
Abstract: This thesis consists of three essays on game theory. In the first essay, we offer the notion of "Bayesian coalitional rationality" and characterize "Bayesian coalitional rationalizability" by common knowledge of Bayesian coalitional rationality. We also show Bayesian coalitional rationalizability is outcome equivalent to a coalitional version of a posteriori equilibrium. These results provide the epistemic foundation of Bayesian coalitional rationalizability. In the second essay, we show that Propositions 3, 4, and 7 in Gul (1996) are incorrect by means of a counterexample. We provide the notion of general tau-theories to restore the aforementioned results and extend Gul's (1996) results on iterated weak dominance and backward induction for 2-person games to n-person games. In the last essay, we propose the solution concept of "perfect correlated equilibria with message-dependent trembling sequences" (PCE^{mdts}), which is a variant of perfect correlated equilibria introduced by Dhillon and Mertens. We show that PCE^{mdts} satisfies "revelation principle".
Appears in Collections:Ph.D Theses (Open)

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