TIMING OF REWARD ALLOCATIONS

Abstract

My dissertation investigates the effect of reward allocation timing on relational norms. The main theoretical point is that timing of reward allocation activates relational norms. I hypothesize that 1) upfront reward allocation activates market pricing relational norm, whereas 2) delayed reward allocation activates communal sharing relational norm (Fiske, 1992). I further hypothesize that the timing of team reward allocation is related to 3) cooperation, 4) conflict and 5) effort; these effects are mediated by the activation of relational norms. I investigate this phenomenon over two studies. A cross-sectional survey with focal founders and co-owners of 43 ventures found that delayed equity split agreements were marginally associated with greater market pricing relational norms and significantly associated with greater conflict. A laboratory experiment manipulating the timing of team reward allocations with 264 undergraduates (88 teams) found that delayed reward allocation increased market pricing relational norms, decreased conflict and increased effort.