KANT'S FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW AND THE RIGHT TO NON-INTERFERENCE

Abstract

This thesis focuses on Kantian justifications for the right to non-interference. In the first part of the thesis, it will be shown that two existing Kantian approaches to grounding this right are problematic. The second part will argue that if the Formula of Universal law is a justified moral principle, then the right to non-interference can be justified by deriving the duty of non-interference from the formula. More specifically, if we apply the formula to “act only on the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”, it is likely that many of us are unable to will some maxims, which express reasons to interfere with others’ pursuits of their ends, as universal law. As a result, it is not morally permissible for us to always compromise others' pursuits and we must sometimes refrain from doing so. Since this duty of non-interference is widely shared by the majority, I argue that it can serve as the basis for our claim to the right to non-interference.