Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
DC FieldValue
dc.titleOn an argument for functional invariance
dc.contributor.authorPelczar, M.
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-13T05:31:39Z
dc.date.available2016-12-13T05:31:39Z
dc.date.issued2008-09
dc.identifier.citationPelczar, M. (2008-09). On an argument for functional invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3) : 373-377. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
dc.identifier.issn09246495
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132366
dc.description.abstractThe principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectConsciousness
dc.subjectDualism
dc.subjectFunctionalism
dc.subjectNaturalism
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentPHILOSOPHY
dc.description.doi10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x
dc.description.sourcetitleMinds and Machines
dc.description.volume18
dc.description.issue3
dc.description.page373-377
dc.description.codenMMACE
dc.identifier.isiut000258657000005
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