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|Title:||On an argument for functional invariance||Authors:||Pelczar, M.||Keywords:||Consciousness
|Issue Date:||Sep-2008||Citation:||Pelczar, M. (2008-09). On an argument for functional invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3) : 373-377. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x||Abstract:||The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.||Source Title:||Minds and Machines||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/132366||ISSN:||09246495||DOI:||10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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