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|Title:||Forms and objects of thought||Authors:||Pelczar, M.W.||Keywords:||Propositional attitudes||Issue Date:||Mar-2007||Citation:||Pelczar, M.W. (2007-03). Forms and objects of thought. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1) : 97-122. ScholarBank@NUS Repository.||Abstract:||It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises. © Springer Science+Business Media 2007.||Source Title:||Linguistics and Philosophy||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/130828||ISSN:||01650157|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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