Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.473.x
DC FieldValue
dc.titleReasons, resultance and moral particularism
dc.contributor.authorMoad, O.E.
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-11T08:01:28Z
dc.date.available2016-11-11T08:01:28Z
dc.date.issued2007-01
dc.identifier.citationMoad, O.E. (2007-01). Reasons, resultance and moral particularism. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226) : 112-116. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.473.x
dc.identifier.issn00318094
dc.identifier.urihttp://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/130150
dc.description.abstractAccording to Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism, the way in which a given moral reason functions as a reason for or against an action can vary from case to case. Dancy also asserts that reasons are resultance bases. But a reason why something ought to be done is that in virtue of which it is something that ought to be done. If the function fa reason can vary, then resultance bases cannot be reasons. Perhaps the particularist might conceive a reason not as a resultance base, but as a specific type of which a resultance base is a token. But this picture of reasons cannot be correct. © 2007 The Author.
dc.description.urihttp://libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.473.x
dc.sourceScopus
dc.typeReview
dc.contributor.departmentPHILOSOPHY
dc.description.doi10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.473.x
dc.description.sourcetitlePhilosophical Quarterly
dc.description.volume57
dc.description.issue226
dc.description.page112-116
dc.identifier.isiut000243811000009
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