Time, Change, and the 'Special Concern'

Abstract

It is sometimes suggested that we have a 'special concern' for future selves, which is justified only if we accept non-reductionism concerning personal survival. As we take ourselves to be justified in the having of such a 'special concern', this suggestion has often been used to strengthen the plausibility of non-reductionism concerning personal survival over reductionism, which allegedly cannot justify the having of such a 'special concern'. This paper suggests that the sort of justified 'special concern' that non-reductionists appeal to is problematic, because it is incompatible with any of the coherent theories of the metaphysics of time and change. There is, however, another version of a justified 'special concern' which is compatible with both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of personal survival. If we accept this latter version of 'special concern', however, then justified 'special concern' can no longer make non-reductionism a more attractive account of personal survival over reductionism.