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|Title:||Mental Maps||Authors:||Blumson, B.||Issue Date:||Sep-2012||Citation:||Blumson, B. (2012-09). Mental Maps. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2) : 413-434. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x||Abstract:||It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis-the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure. © 2011 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC.||Source Title:||Philosophy and Phenomenological Research||URI:||http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124454||ISSN:||00318205||DOI:||10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00499.x|
|Appears in Collections:||Staff Publications|
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