Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x
Title: Peer transparency in teams: Does it help or hinder incentives?
Authors: Bag, P.K. 
Pepito, N.
Issue Date: Nov-2012
Citation: Bag, P.K., Pepito, N. (2012-11). Peer transparency in teams: Does it help or hinder incentives?. International Economic Review 53 (4) : 1257-1286. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x
Abstract: In a joint project involving two players of a two-round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other's efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency eliminates the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players' efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts. © (2012) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Source Title: International Economic Review
URI: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124317
ISSN: 00206598
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x
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