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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.10.001
Title: | Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments | Authors: | Lu, Y. Wright, J. |
Keywords: | Collusion Intertemporal reaction functions Kinked demand curve |
Issue Date: | May-2010 | Citation: | Lu, Y., Wright, J. (2010-05). Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments. International Journal of Industrial Organization 28 (3) : 298-306. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.10.001 | Abstract: | Tacit collusion is explored under a strategy in which, loosely speaking, firms match the lowest price set by any firm in the previous period. Conditions are provided under which this strategy supports collusive outcomes in a subgame perfect equilibrium. In contrast to traditional results, the highest collusive price is always lower than the monopoly price. It corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium price when upward and downward price deviations are matched. Our paper provides a game theoretic interpretation of the old kinked demand curve theory which unlike earlier attempts does not depart from standard timing assumptions to do so. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | Source Title: | International Journal of Industrial Organization | URI: | http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/124312 | ISSN: | 01677187 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.10.001 |
Appears in Collections: | Staff Publications |
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