INTUITION-USE IN FOOT, THOMSON, AND KAMM: A CASE STUDY

Abstract

This dissertation first seeks to understand what "moral intuitions" are, and what role they play, in three prominent ethics papers: (1) Philippa Foot's "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect", (2) Judith Jarvis Thomson's "The Trolley Problem", and (3) Frances Kamm's "Harming Some to Save Others".

These papers have been selected because they are often cited as examples of philosophical work which make extensive use of moral intuitions. The papers also form a continuous and sustained discussion about the same ethical issues.

Subsequently, this dissertation considers Daniel Kahneman's empirical findings in psychology and behavioural economics, about the systematic errors that beset intuitive judgements. In light of those findings, the dissertation attempts to unpack concerns about the kind of extensive intuition use found in Foot, Thomson, and Kamm's papers.

Finally, this dissertation makes some small suggestions about what role moral intuitions could play in moral philosophy.