EU ACCESSION AND THE POLITICS OF VETO: THE CASE STUDIES OF CROATIA AND MACEDONIA

Abstract

UNTIL RECENTLY THE MOST COMMON TYPE OF CONFLICT TO BE FOUND DURING THE PROCESS OF EU ENLARGEMENT WAS THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT. THEORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT TELLS US THAT THIS TYPE OF CONFLICT OCCURS WHEN CONCERNS ARISE, AMONG EXISTING EU MEMBERS, OF UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF ENLARGEMENT COSTS AND BENEFITS DUE TO AN ACCESSION OF A NEW MEMBER.MORE RECENTLY HOWEVER, ANOTHER KIND OF CONFLICT ? A NON-DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT - HAS EMERGED THAT CHALLENGES THE DOMINANT THEORETICAL DISCOURSE. THIS TYPE OF CONFLICT IS NOT FINANCIAL OR ECONOMIC IN NATURE, IS NOT RELATED TO THE EU ACQUIS, AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE SOLVED WITH EITHER OF THE TWO MECHANISMS. SINCE 1994 FOUR EU MEMBERS HAVE USED VETO TO BLOCK ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS OF THEIR NEIGHBOURING, EU CANDIDATE COUNTRIES. THE REASONS FOR BLOCKADES WERE NOT RELATED TO THE EU ACQUIS, BUT INSTEAD TO TERRITORY, IDENTITY OR A MIXTURE OF BOTH. THIS THESIS LOOKS AT THE CASES OF CROATIA AND MACEDONIA TO ANSWER THE PUZZLE OF WHY HAVE NON-DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLIC